The issue with the initial state in quantum mechanics by Inamori, Hitoshi
ar
X
iv
:1
81
0.
11
51
6v
1 
 [q
ua
nt-
ph
]  
26
 O
ct 
20
18
The issue with the initial state in quantum
mechanics
Hitoshi Inamori
Socie´te´ Ge´ne´rale
Boulevard Franck Kupka, 92800 Puteaux, France
October 30, 2018
Abstract
In the conventional formulation of quantum mechanics, the initial de-
scription is given only for the physical system under study. It factors out
the state for the experimenter. We argue that such description is incom-
plete and can lead to statements which can in theory be meaningless. We
propose that within a complete description, the initial state must include
the state of the experimenter. With such formulation quantum mechanics
provides joint probabilities for conjointly observed events, rather than a
probability conditional on some initial state for the system under study.
This feature is desirable, as with quantum mechanics, statements on what
happened in the past may have no meaning in the present.
Keywords: Quantum mechanics, Relative State formulation of quan-
tum mechanics, Measurement, Entanglement
1 The initial state in the conventional formula-
tion of quantum mechanics
In quantum mechanics, a physical system B is described by a vector or “state”
in a Hilbert space HB. In a conventional quantum mechanical description of an
experiment, we say that the system B is initially in a normalized state |χa〉 at a
time tA, with probability p(a), where a = 1, 2, . . . correspond to possible initial
states.
In the absence of a measurement, any evolution which is physically allowed
is described by a unitary operator acting on the Hilbert space for the system
under study. In this case, let’s denote by VB the unitary operator acting on
HB, transforming the initial state |χa〉 at time tA into the state VB |χa〉 at
a later time tB . Suppose that a measurement is performed on B at tB after
this evolution. A measurement can be described as a projective measurement
onto an orthonormal basis {|j〉B}j of HB, and the conditional probability of
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obtaining the measurement outcome b given that initial state was a is given
by the Born rule p(b|a) = |B〈b|VB |χa〉 |
2. For ease of notation, we define the
basis |j〉B(tA) = V
†
B |j〉B, in which case we obtain p(b|a) = |B(tA)〈b|χa〉|
2. The
conventional formulation of quantum mechanics gives conditional probabilities
of an event at tB, conditional on a realized preparation at the beginning of
the experiment tA. This is the description of quantum mechanical laws that is
usually taught in physics textbooks.
2 A complete description of the initial state in
quantum mechanics
The purpose of this note is to show that this conventional description does not
give a complete picture for the initial state of the experiment.
Following the well known insight by Everett [1], we need to understand that
the initial state for the system B above is the result of a prior physical process
involving the experimenter. Let’s call A the experimenter, and denote by HA
the Hilbert space associated with A. When we say that the systemB is in a state
|χa〉, what really happened, without loss of generality, is that the experimenter
A interacted with B leading to a superposition of states
|ψ〉 =
∑
i
αi |i〉A ⊗ |χi〉 (1)
and happens to observe the outcome a. Here {|i〉A}i=1,2,... is a set of some
orthonormal states in HA, where each |i〉A corresponds to a situation in which
A observes the outcome i for the initial preparation.
Now, as discussed in [1], the system made of A and B, denoted by A⊗B, is
an isolated quantum system seen from the outside, and as such should follow a
unitary transformation.
Therefore, the initial state of the system after the preparation of B remains
a superposition of states in which each possible outcome for the measurement
by A is present. The complete initial state for A⊗B is not a classical probabilis-
tic mixture of states as described in the conventional description of quantum
mechanics, but a superposition of joint states in A ⊗ B in which states for A
and states for B are entangled.
In other words, the initial state for the experiment should not be a density
operator ρ =
∑
a p(a) |χa〉 〈χa| describing a classical mixture in which B is
in state |χa〉 with probability p(a), but a superposition of states in A ⊗ B as
represented in Equation (1).
With this complete description for the initial state, quantum mechanics does
no longer provide a conditional probability based on a supposed realization of
an initial preparation. Rather, quantum mechanics provides joint probabilities
for the observation of a and the outcome b of the experiment.
As the set {|j〉B(tA)}j form a basis for HB, the states |χi〉 can be written
as |χi〉 =
∑
j βij |j〉B(tA) for some set of complex numbers βij and therefore the
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initial state reads as:
|ψ〉 =
∑
ij
µij |i〉A ⊗ |j〉B(tA) (2)
where µij = αiβij . Because the states |χi〉 are normalized, we have
∑
j |µij |
2 =
|αi|
2
∑
j |βij |
2 = |αi|
2.
The joint probability of having the initial preparation a and the experiment
outcome b is now
p(a, b) = Tr
(
1A ⊗ VB |ψ〉 〈ψ|1A ⊗ V
†
B |a〉A ⊗ |b〉B A〈a| ⊗ B〈b|
)
(3)
= |µab|
2 (4)
using the relation |j〉B(tA) = V
†
B |j〉B.
3 Prediction and Retrodiction
Because the complete description of the initial state leads to joint probabilities,
it is straightforward to obtain marginal and conditional probabilities:
p(A = a) =
∑
j
p(A = a,B = j) =
∑
j
|µaj |
2 (5)
p(B = b|A = a) =
p(A = a,B = b)
p(A = a)
=
|µab|
2
∑
j |µaj |
2
(6)
p(B = b) =
∑
i
p(A = i, B = b) =
∑
i
|µib|
2 (7)
p(A = a|B = b) =
p(A = a,B = b)
p(B = b)
=
|µab|
2
∑
i |µib|
2
(8)
where for the sake of clarity, we have added the system being observed in the
notation.
Note that the formula which gives the conditional probability for the final
event b based on the initial event a, p(B = b|A = a), is symmetric with the
formula giving the conditional probability for the initial event a based on the
final event b, p(A = a|B = b).
The conditional probability p(B = b|A = a) is a predictive one. Given the
initial state a, we try to guess what the final state b is going to be at a later
time. This is the conditional probability that is provided by the conventional
formulation of quantum mechanics, and which is of practical interest most of
the time.
In comparison, the calculation of the conditional probability p(A = a|B = b)
is a retrodictive one. We try to guess what was a past state a from the realization
of a final state b.
There is an interesting literature [2, 3, 4] about the way one can try to retro-
dict past event probabilities from the observation of the present state. Many
papers note that an asymmetry appears between prediction and retrodiction in
3
the following sense: on the prediction side, once the realization a for the initial
state is known, one can deduce the conditional probability distribution for the
final outcome b without any further assumption, as given by the Born rule:
p(B = b|A = a) = Tr
(
|b〉B B〈b|VB |χa〉 〈χa|V
†
B
)
= |βab|
2. (9)
This should come as no surprise as the predictive conditional probability
is precisely what is given directly by the conventional formulation of quantum
mechanics.
By contrast, the last formula does not allow to compute the conditional
probability for a given a realization of b. This is to be expected as one cannot
deduce conditional probabilities p(A = a|B = b) when one is only provided with
the conditional probabilities p(B = b|A = a), because
p(A = a|B = b) = p(B = b|A = a)
p(A = a)
p(B = b)
(10)
= p(B = b|A = a)
p(A = a)∑
i p(B = b|A = i)p(A = i)
, (11)
and that the probabilities p(A = i) are not given by the above formula. It is
true that one can add the information about the marginal probabilities for a
by expressing the initial state as a classical mixture of states ρ =
∑
a p(A =
a) |χa〉 〈χa|, however the predictive formula and the retrodictive formula still
bear a mathematical asymmetry in the way they are deduced in the conventional
description of quantum mechanics.
In the next section we will identify the origin of this asymmetry with an
effort to give more physical insight. We propose that the correct description of
a quantum state should include the state of the experimenter. The conventional
formulation in which the experimenter is factored out is – as far as theory is
concerned – a special case which is correct only under certain conditions.
4 The trouble with the conventional formula-
tion of quantum mechanics
Let’s come back to the complete description of the initial state as given in
Equation (1). A partial description of the state restricted to the system B is
obtained by tracing over the Hilbert space HA:
ρB = TrA (|ψ〉 〈ψ|) =
∑
i
|αi|
2 |χi〉 〈χi| =
∑
i
p(A = i) |χi〉 〈χi| (12)
as p(A = i) =
∑
j |µij |
2 = |αi|
2. Without surprise, we find the mixture of states
for B with which we would start in the conventional formulation of quantum
mechanics. Therefore, provided that the experiment only affects the system B,
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the complete description presented in this note gives results that are identical
to what the conventional description gives.
What is the point of introducing the complete description if it gives exactly
the same results as the conventional one?
Note that in the reasoning above, we had to assume that the experiment
was only affecting the system B, that is, the experiment was not affecting the
system A. In particular, we had to assume that after the preparation of the
initial state, the system A was no longer interacting with the system B. One
could defend such hypothesis by arguing that the result a, being witnessed by
an experimenter, is a classical information encoded in a macroscopic state that
cannot be altered by the experiment.
But is this really the case?
The result a, as any information, must be stored in a physical system. The
outcome a has no longer meaning if this physical system is altered. The state-
ment “B = b at time tB, conditional on A = a at time tA” has a meaning only
if at the time when the statement is made, we can observe a physical proof that
A was a at the past time tA.
Suppose that A shows the outcome a at time tB. Does this prove that A = a
at time tA? We could argue that the system A is an isolated system after the
preparation of B and that A could not evolve between times tA and tB or that
A is macroscopic enough not to evolve between tA and tB.
However it seems more likely that B interacts in one way or another with
the system A even after the initial preparation of B. Indeed A had interacted
with B at some prior time for the preparation of B, and it seems difficult to
accept that all possible interactions can been turned off perfectly between A
and B after tA. Therefore, at least in theory, the fact A = a at time tB does
not guarantee that the statement A = a at time tA is true. As a consequence,
the statement “B = b at t = tB conditional on A = a at t = tA” has no rigorous
meaning in theory, because we cannot ascertain that A = a at time t = tA
when B is observed. The only fact that can be ascertained when B is observed,
ultimately, is what is observed conjointly with the observation of B. In our
case, we cannot ascertain that A = a at time t = tA, but we can ascertain that
A = a at time t = tB if A is observed conjointly with B.
We can make statement only about relationships between observations made
simultaneously or conjointly. This is precisely what the complete description of
initial state gives: indeed, if interaction between A and B cannot be ruled out
after tA, nothing prevents us from describing the interaction, say UAB, between
A and B after tA. This is possible because we have kept a complete quantum
description for A⊗B:
|ψ〉 7→ UAB |ψ〉 (13)
and then we can compute the joint probability for the outcomes obtained from
the conjoint observation of A and B at time tB :
p(A = a,B = b) = Tr
(
UAB |ψ〉 〈ψ|U
†
AB |a〉A ⊗ |b〉B A〈a| ⊗ B〈b|
)
. (14)
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The complete description gives joint probabilities of events that are observed
at a same time, in a conjoint observation. It does not attempt to give a relation-
ship with a past event that is no longer observable, but a relationship between
two simultaneous events that are observable. In this sense, the complete de-
scription adopts a fundamentally different view from the conventional one: it
abandons the notion of a realized event in the past. Instead, it gives relationship
between direct observations that are done conjointly or simultaneously.
5 Conclusion
We have argued that a complete description of an initial state must encompass
the experimenter who has entangled himself or herself with the physical system
under study. By reducing the initial state to a mixture of states describing the
system under study only, the conventional formulation of quantum mechanics
neglects potential interaction between the studied system and the experimenter
after the preparation phase. Such approximation may well be justified in prac-
tice, but in theory there seem to be no way to guarantee the independence of the
experimenter and the system under study during the experiment. Taking the
initial state for the complete joint system including the experimenter allows to
circumvent this issue properly, within a rigorous and unambiguous formalism.
Past event does not have an existence per se and must be encoded in a
physical system. By accepting that we cannot neglect the interaction between
the physical system encoding the outcome of the preparation and the evolu-
tion of the physical system under study, we acknowledged that past event may
not have an unambiguous definition at the end of the experiment. The set of
observables that do have unambiguous meaning taken together are observables
that are witnessed conjointly. Describing the quantum system for the complete
system including the experimenter allows to give joint probabilities for such set
of observables. The conventional formulation, by introducing the notion of past
event, cannot be always consistent because the past event may not even be
defined by the time the experiment’s outcome is observed.
Obviously, we can introduce physical system that do serve as a “marker”
for the past, such as the experimenter memory or a written note describing
the outcome of the preparation phase. These systems can be included in the
complete description of the initial state. They can be observed at the end of
the experiment, and we could interpret this outcome as reflecting events that
happened in what we call the “past” [5]. However, these markers can themselves
interact with the system under study, and as such cannot serve as a proof of
the events in the past, or even demonstrate that the past in which such event
happened existed at all.
We commonly assume that what we witness in the present is explained –
at least partially – by what happened in the past. Physical laws describe the
relationship between such past events and present observations. However, ev-
erything we know is ultimately based on present observation: we may categorize
some data, such as the output from our memory or the writings in a notebook,
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as coming from a “past”, but such categorization remains observer-dependent.
Classical physics allows the existence of a past that has an unambiguous
definition and that is completely deterministic. This is because classical physics
itself is fully deterministic. There is only one trajectory allowed for the state of
the system once it is completely known at some instant. As such, assuming the
existence of a deterministic past does not lead to any inconsistency.
Quantum mechanics does not allow such certainty, and as we have seen in
this note, attempting to introduce a notion of deterministic past condition does
introduce inconsistencies under general situations. In quantum mechanics, the
only known data are the data obtained conjointly from a single measurement.
Physical laws do no longer provide relationship between some past and present.
Rather they provide relationship between two categories of data, the one which
the observer classifies as “coming from the past” and the other which the ob-
server classifies as “coming from the present”. Both sets of data are nevertheless
obtained conjointly from a single measurement.
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